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This article sets out to analyse the role of 
the Kaliningrad region in the Polish foreign 
policy after 1989. The analysis focuses on the 
political and regional determinants, which 
had the greatest impact on the Poland-
Kaliningrad region relations. The methodol-
ogy used in the article is not unusual for po-
litical science and is based on analysing 
original (documents) and secondary (schol-
arly publications, press articles) sources. The 
authors also use the system and decision 
analysis methods. The analysis covers the pe-
riod after 1989, when the geopolitical changes 
brought about by the collapse of the Yalta-
Potsdam order resulted in Poland redefine the 
priorities of its foreign policy. One of the most 
important challenges for the Polish diplomacy 
after 1989 was the development of economic 
and political relations with the Russian Fed-
eration. Cross-border cooperation between 
Poland and the Kaliningrad Region is 
conducted, inter alia, through euroregional 
structures functioning in the border areas. 
The analysis of this issue is vital for further 
cooperation in the Polish-Russian borderland, 
especially after the conclusion of the local 
border traffic agreement in 2012. 
The authors come to a conclusion that the 
implementation of the local border traffic 
agreement can improve cross-border relations 
but it will not significantly change the role of the 
Kaliningrad region in the Polish foreign policy. 
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Foreign Policy of Poland  
and Kaliningrad Region in 1989—2012 
 
Foreign policy at the turn of XX and 
XXI century has to take into account the 
challenges connected with the processes 
of globalization and international integra-
tion. Setting priorities, implementing ap-
propriate methods and means and achiev-
ing chosen goals hinges upon numerous 
internal as well as external factors. How-
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ever, the politics of a country depends mostly on geopolitical changes influ-
encing that country. Foreign policy of the modern European countries has to 
additionally take into consideration the character of the European Union 
whose characteristic is the fact that external policy of the member states 
takes place on both levels; namely supranational and national. Poland, which 
is the member state of the European Union, has limited sovereignty as far as 
making decisions about its political relations with other countries (and obvi-
ously with Russia) are concerned. 
 
New priorities of the Polish foreign policy 
 
The geopolitical changes, brought about by the collapse of the Yalta-
Potsdam order, resulted in Poland’s being able to redefine the priorities of its 
foreign policy. As a consequence of the collapse of the USSR, Czechoslovakia 
and unification of Germany, Poland found itself in a completely new geopoliti-
cal situation, surrounded by new neighbours: the Russian Federation, Lithuania, 
Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany. Of particular im-
portance for the Polish foreign policy were the relationships with the two re-
gional powers — Russia and Germany — and with Ukraine, which was per-
ceived by the Polish authorities as an important stabilising factor in the region. 
In 1990’s Poland redefined its new relationships with its eastern 
neighbours, especially with Russia. Polish attempts to join NATO met with 
fierce opposition from the Russian authorities. Moscow argued that NATO 
expansion eastwards would disturb the balance of power in the region, pos-
ing a threat to the Russian Federation itself. Poland’s accession to the Euro-
pean Union did not raise such objections from its neighbour from the east. 
However, one should remember about the reservations raised by Russia con-
cerning the necessity to introduce visas for the Russian citizens, inhabiting 
one of its regions, the Kalinigrad Region., which is an enclave, separated 
from the remaining part of Russia by the territory of Poland and Lithuania. 
Under Boris Yeltsin’s presidency Soviet troops were withdrawn from 
Polish territory and responsibility for the massacre of Polish officers in Ka-
tyn accepted. In turn, the Polish state assumed material responsibility for es-
tates left in the East by Polish citizens in the aftermath of post-war border 
shifts and attendant mass relocations. Concurrently, Poland’s striving for 
NATO membership has led to durable tension in Polish-Russian relations. 
The advent of president Vladimir Putin brought further regress in mutual re-
lations. Presumably, this is connected with the evaluation of Poland’s role on 
the global stage—both present and future [3, p. 20]. 
One of the most important challenges for the Polish diplomacy after 
1989 was development of economic and political relationships with the Rus-
sian Federation. It is important for Poland that in contacts with Russia and 
cross-border cooperation should be promoted, especially that with the Kalin-
ingrad Region — the only area where both countries have a common border. 
 
The modification of geopolitical significance of Kaliningrad Oblast 
 
The Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation fulfils a particular 
role in the Baltic Sea Region, resulting first of all from its specific geopoliti-
cal conditions, which include: 
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— the fact that it is the western-most part of Russia; 
— the existence on its territory of the only warm-water Russian Baltic 
ports, in which the Baltic Fleet is stationed. The Fleet has its ports also in the 
Finnish Gulf, but their function is rather secondary. They freeze during the 
winter period, their flow capacity is smaller and they are easy to block; 
— the geopolitical status of an enclave, surrounded by member states of 
the EU and NATO [1, p. 70—76]. 
The Baltic Sea Region is not one of the priorities of the Russian foreign 
policy, but it must be noted that it plays an important role in the European 
dimension. The Baltic Sea is of great importance to the Russian Federation, 
first of all because of the protection of its economic interests, since, as in 
2001 the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Kasyanov, 
pointed out, half of the foreign trade transport by sea is through the Baltic. 
For this reason, there has been an evident activation of Moscow’s policy to-
wards the enclave and the whole Baltic Region, directed to improve the so-
cial and economic situation in the Region. 
Taking into consideration the deeply rooted Russian perception of the 
Baltic Region as a historical gate to the west and the belief of the Russian 
military authorities that the Baltic Republics constitute a Russian strategic 
area, the necessity to withdraw from these republics was particularly unfa-
vourable from the point of view of the strategic interests of Russia. Although 
many Russian politicians see risks to the security of Russia mainly in the 
south and the east, some analytic centres closely related to Russian military 
authorities pointed to the challenge which would be posed to the Russian se-
curity in north-eastern Europe as the Baltic Republics joined NATO [1, 
p. 70—76]. 
Around the Baltic Sea Basin there have been tendencies towards lesser 
militarization and greater co-operation, borders are less stressed and region-
alization is more emphasised. Rarely has Russia in its history favoured such 
a direction of changes. However, in the last decade some changes in its pol-
icy have been observed. The choice of Russia — with some hesitation — is 
worthy of notice, although problems related directly or indirectly to the Ka-
liningrad Region of the RF cannot be ignored. As a result of the integration 
processes in central-eastern Europe, the Region has become a permanent is-
sue and one of the priority elements in the dialog between the EU and Russia 
[4, p. 391]. 
In emphasizing the interests, dangers and opportunities of the Region, 
which have resulted from the admission of Poland and Lithuania into the 
EU, Russia takes part in the discussion concerning the future shape of 
Europe. In this context, the Region has become an important instrument of 
the European policy of Russia, and it is very likely that this importance will 
continue to increase. 
 
The development of cross-border and euro-regional cooperation  
with Kaliningrad Oblast 
 
Poland and The Baltic Sea countries have been building up a network of 
cooperation since 1988. It’s important that this cooperation is not limited to 
the national governments. Provinces, lands and cities also cooperate between 
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themselves. Shelwig-Holstein works with Danish regions, Estonia, Kalinin-
grad, southern Sweden and one finish Region. This cooperation includes: 
small and medium sized enterprises, cross-border cooperation, joint informa-
tion centers [2, p. 226—245]. 
Cross-border cooperation between Poland and the Kaliningrad Region is 
carried on, among other ways, through the euroregional structures 
functioning in the border areas. These structures include the Euroregion 
“Baltic” (since 22 February 1998), Euroregion “Niemen” (since 6 June 
1997) and Euroregion “Łyna-Ława”. 
Poland participates in said euroregions through specially created 
communal associations bringing together actors interested in cross-border 
cooperation. This is connected with certain expenses, for example paying 
membership fees, but it also opens up the perspective of enormous benefits. 
One such benefit is the possibility of getting EU funds for local projects. 
Yet, it must be kept in mind that the projects have to involve at least one 
major foreign partner from the euroregion. This makes it necessary to 
establish cross-border contacts, which could include contacts with the 
neighbouring Kaliningrad Region. Euroregions by regulating the flow of 
information and redistributing EU funds the euroregions exert pressure on 
Polish local governments to search for partners abroad. They thus play an 
important role in stimulating cross-border cooperation. Moreover, the 
euroregional structure enables local administrative employees to gain 
experience in applying for EU grants and programming EU aid. Small 
euroregional projects especially, contribute to the strengthening of contacts 
and the formation of lasting relationships between international partners in 
border regions [2, p. 226—245]. 
Cross—border cooperation between Polish voivodships and Kaliningrad 
Region can develop social and economic centres through common projects 
which can be supported by European Union. Cross—border cooperation 
within the framework of the European Union and others international institu-
tions raises questions of the transnational and multilevel governance. But this 
kind of cooperation has impact on regional development by building the connec-
tions between political, economic or cultural communities. This cooperation 
creates new possibilities in following fields of regional development: 
1. promotion of urban, rural and costal development; 
2. strengthening the spirit of enterprise; 
3. developing small and medium-sized enterprises, including those in 
the tourism sector; 
4. developing local employment initiatives; 
5. improving transport, information and communication networks; 
6. increasing human and institutional potential for cross-border coop-
eration [8, p. 7—12]. 
 
Kaliningrad Oblast and Polish national security 
 
In Moscow on 14th December 2011 was signed an agreement between 
the government of the Republic of Poland and the government of the Rus-
sian Federation about local border traffic. It stipulates that inhabitants in cer-
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tain parts of Poland namely Pomerania and Masuria will no longer need vi-
sas in order to cross the border. They will only be required to possess valid 
passports (travel documents) and special permission entitling to local border 
traffic. The agreement about local border traffic solely concerns land border 
crossings (by road or rail)1. 
So far there has been a consensus among Polish political parties in re-
gard to Polish-Russian relations concerning Kaliningrad Region. However, 
exception to this rule is the issue of signing of the agreement about local 
border traffic. Some of the political parties like Law and Justice and Solidary 
Party expressed reservations to this agreement. In fact these parties voted 
against ratification of this agreement. 
The parties raised the following objections. They pointed to the fact that 
the agreement institutes highly preferential principles concerning local bor-
der traffic. They also claim that Kaliningrad Region is the sole enclave in the 
close vicinity of European Union and Nato which is used for military pur-
poses. That is why efforts of the Polish government aiming at establishing 
highly preferential terms in local border traffic and correspondingly includ-
ing the whole Kaliningrad Region to this preferential conditions seem to be 
groundless, incompatible in the face of Russian politics which clearly tries to 
undermine Polish defensive system and Polish political strength. To illus-
trate this thesis Polish opposition points to the building of Nord Stream gas 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea, Polish food embargo. There are also other 
cases like still unresolved issue of shipping in Vistula Lagoon or shipping 
Polish vessels through Pilawska Strait [6, p. 38]. 
During voting of the ratification of the agreement it was pointed out that 
Russia undertakes actions which are harmful to Polish defensive system 
what can threaten Polish sovereignty. Polish politicians meant Russian plans 
of deploying in Kaliningrad Region missiles Iskander. According to 
“Niezawisimaja Gazeta” Russian headquarters in Moscow has approved cre-
ating jobs in the unit in the Russian Baltic Fleet where Iskander missiles are 
going to be deployed. It is important to say that Iskander missiles, with a 
range from 350km to 500 km will be targeted mainly at Poland. Iskander 
missiles can also carry unconventional tactical, nuclear warheads. Press 
Agency Interfax has informed that there are plans to deploy in Kaliningrad 
Region S — 400 Triumph- surface to air missile system of the fourth genera-
tion. According to Russian sources the system can track and guide at six dif-
ferent aims at the same time with range up to 400 km. Also, on 30th Novem-
ber last year a new radiolocation system was launched in Kaliningrad Re-
gion. The system is constituted of type Woroneż- DM radar. Its range is 
4500km and it can be increased to 6000 km. Unlike old stations like Dniepr, 
Wołga the new system is capable of tracking and monitoring not only strate-
gic missiles but also operation-tactical missiles and maneuvering missiles [6, 
p. 39]. According to Polish right wing parties these actions undermine Polish 
political and military situation. Radosław Sikorski, The Minister of Foreign 
                                                     
1 See. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation on the Rules of Local Border Traffic. 
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Affairs in his expose emphasized that “We are glad that the Agreement on 
Local Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad Oblast is due to be implemented 
soon; we are all the more surprised by signals pointing to plans to deploy 
newgeneration offensive arms in the area” [7]. 
 
Local border traffic 
 
The Council of Ministers has adopted the priorities of Polish foreign pol-
icy for the years 2012—2016 in March 2012. Some of them have been con-
nected with relations with Russian Federation and Kaliningrad Region. Pol-
ish government emphasized that “Poland intends to maintain good, prag-
matic relations with Russia on the basis of reciprocity. Political dialogue and 
economic contacts can be intensified due to positive dynamics in these rela-
tions. Russia also strives for a rapprochement with Europe. This is now 
prompted mainly by the country’s official modernisation programme, which 
is focused on research and technology. For this reason Poland supports Rus-
sia’s efforts aimed at fulfilment of conditions for OECD membership. Po-
land’s support for Russia’s reforms should also involve, among other sup-
port, Warsaw’s stressing its vision of EU Partnership for Modernisation. 
This vision will not only be founded on technology transfer, but also on sup-
port for the process of building the rule of law and political pluralism. The 
Agreement on the Rules of Local Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad Re-
gion can become a litmus test of its practical implementation. Poland is also 
in favour of a speedy conclusion of negotiations leading to the signing of a 
New EU-Russia Agreement, a comprehensive agreement that also covers the 
issue of mutual protection of investments, and opts for the start of negotia-
tions on an EU-Russia free trade agreement. Systematic efforts to liberalise 
visa regimes are essential to bringing Russia and the whole eastern 
neighbourhood closer to the European Union. However, this should be done 
on the basis of reciprocity and parallelism for Eastern Partnership countries 
and Russia, at very least” [5, p. 18]. 
 
Conclusions 
 
After the analysis of the problem of Kaliningrad Region and Polish for-
eign policy in 1989—2011, the following conclusions: 
— Kaliningrad was not one of the main priorities of Polish diplomacy; it 
was not also a priority in Polish-Russian relations; 
— Russian enclave in the first half of the 90s was perceived by the Pol-
ish government largely through the prism of military threats; 
— Poland treated Kaliningrad Region as an important issue for the de-
velopment of security and stability in the Baltic Sea region; 
— In its relations with the Russian enclave Poland drew particular atten-
tion to the development of cross-border cooperation; 
— Polish-Russian border cooperation has been largely conditioned by 
the state of political relations at the interstate; 
— Kaliningrad began to play a greater role in the Polish foreign policy 
the time before the Polish accession to the European Union, which was 
caused by problems related to the introduction of visas for Russians; 
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— Successful negotiations on local border traffic were deemed by the 
authorities of the two countries as one the major successes in bilateral rela-
tions after Poland’s becoming the member of the European Union; 
— Implementation of the agreement about local border traffic may im-
prove cross border relations but it will not change significantly the role of 
Kaliningrad Oblast in Polish foreign policy. 
 
This article summurises the results of the research work presented at the con-
ference “EU-Russia common space: probems and solutions”. 
The conference was organized by the EU Centre of the I. Kant Baltic Federal 
University (www. kantiana. ru/eu4u) in Veliky Novgorod on May 25—26, 2012 
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